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INTRODUCTION
Criminal law, as it is currently practiced in the United
States, is based on notions that are part of a folk psychology.
These folk psychological notions are increasingly at odds with
what the fields of behavioral sciences  have discovered about
behavior over the past 40 or 50 years.  Many philosophers and
cognitive scientists have argued that our everyday speculations
about mental states constitute an informal theory of the causes
of behavior, a so-called “folk psychology”.  Folk psychology uses
everyday terms such as “belief” and “desire”, “hunger”, “pain”
“will”, “intent”, “motive” and so forth.  Such accounts are based
upon perceptions and explanations of behavior that humans,
through experience, seem to naturally generate.  The major
problem with folk psychologies is that they are not subject to
empirical verification.  As we will argue, some of the particular
folk psychological beliefs upon which criminal law is based, do
not accurately embody current psychological knowledge.
Although there are a number of practices within the
criminal law system that are based on folk psychological theories,
this paper will focus on the assumption within the law that people
have free will and therefore when they make bad choices it makes
sense to punish them.
As we will argue in this paper, the belief that people act
freely has been largely discredited from a scientific perspective.
This paper will first briefly discuss how folk psychologies arise,
and why they continue to exist.  It will then present evidence
that the theory of free will in particular is not supported by
psychological research.  Finally, it will propose an alternative
view of criminal behavior.  A major component of this alternative
view is that crime may be much better explained by factors such
as a low stage of development, high impulsivity, use of drugs,
and poor attachment, suggesting that crime may be better
addressed by intensive rehabilitation not punishment.
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1 WHY DO FOLK PSYCHOLOGIES ARISE AND
WHAT DO THEY CONSIST OF?
Research has shown that between the ages of 3 and 4 in
what Piaget calls the preoperational stage (Piaget, 1954),
children naturally develop a “belief-desire theory of mind”
(Wellman, 1990).  This ‘theory’ (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992) is
seen in the fact that children behave as if (and increasingly talk
as if) their beliefs and desires are what cause their behavior, as
well as the behavior of others.  It appears that the development
of such theories of mind (or folk psychologies) are particularly
encouraged in cultures where parents spend time discussing
motives and intentions, as well as mental states, as they do in
the United States (Sabbagh & Callahan, 1998).  An important
part of this theory of mind is a sense of free will.  Even though
the sense of free will persists into adulthood it is an illusion, as
discussed below.
The tendency to attribute mental states to ourselves and
to others is quite powerful, as seen in a study done quite a while
back by Heider & Simmel (1944).  The researchers showed a
short film, which consisted of different simple shapes such as
triangles or squares, moving about on the screen.  When asked
to report what they saw, the majority of the subjects attributed
motives and intentions to the inanimate shapes.  It seems highly
likely that this tendency would be much stronger when people
are observing animate subjects, including people.  At the same
time that people have a tendency to attribute psychological states
to themselves and to others, related work has shown that they
do not necessarily do so accurately.  In a review, Nisbett and
Wilson (1977) reported that in a large number of studies
conducted by many different investigators, people showed “little
ability to report accurately on their cognitive processes.”  They
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instead may offer contrived or confabulated explanations of
behavior.  These two studies foreshadow the points to be made
here: first, that it is people’s natural tendency to try and explain
the behavior of others, and second, that the explanations that
they come up with are not necessarily accurate.
Folk psychology as seen in adults, is an explicit or implicit
theory about the causes of behavior.  This theory is seen in
everyday talk about mental states.  We make statements that
link sensory experiences to mental states; mental states to other
mental states; and mental states to behavior.  We might say that
the smell of cookies baking made Jessie feel hungry.  Jessie wanted
to eat a cookie, but also felt bad about eating a cookie because
Jessie thought she was overweight. Nevertheless, Jessie went to
the cookie jar and got a cookie because Jessie wanted a cookie.
The key aspect of many of the folk psychological beliefs is that
people freely plan their actions, and that their intention or wish
to obtain something is in fact what leads to the action.  This is
the notion of free will.
2 NOTIONS OF FREE WILL AND COMPETENCY
Notions of free will were systematized very early on, for
example, by Aristotle, and then incorporated into Christian
theology and law by Thomas Aquinas.  Aristotle held that virtue
was the product of action and habit, and action was a result of
free will.  Pretty much all philosophers until the late twentieth
century have agreed with this. The idea that people freely choose
to act underlies much of what happens within the criminal
justice system when people commit crimes.  If people freely
choose to carry out a crime, they then can be punished for their
actions.  The punishment, in this case, is meant to teach them
that they do not in fact have a free choice in this matter, and in
the future must think about their actions more carefully.
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The doctrine of free will, which Aristotle states, is really
derived from the sensation of free will.  We all experience the
sense of free will and so the idea that free will exists appears to
be confirmed by our everyday experience.  This sense seems to
result from the fact that before we act we have the sense that we
are about to act, and we usually even anticipate the action we
are about to perform.  Because of this, we think that these prior
thoughts have caused our action.  As we will discuss, this is an
illusion, but one that is very hard to overcome.
Commons and colleagues (in preparation; Commons &
Armstrong-Roche, 1985) carried out an experiment on this
topic.  Participants were randomly presented with two kinds of
stimuli.  In the first condition, it was very easy for participants
to tell which stimulus duration was long and which was short.
The participants were asked, “How much of a sense of free will
did you have?”  And they said, “Oh, a great deal.”  In fact, it
was the stimulus conditions being easy that made it easy for them
to make the right choice.  The stimuli controlled their behavior.
In the second condition, they were given two stimuli very close
in duration, which was a hard choice.  Following this condition,
they reported having no experience of free will.  In this latter
case, their choice could, if such a thing existed, be under the
control of a free will, since the stimuli were so difficult to tell
apart that their choice was essentially random, and so relatively
free from the stimulus conditions.  Instead, they experienced
themselves as helpless and as not being able to determine their
actions.  A related example may be seen when one asks people
about when they are asleep and dreaming and there is nothing
impinging on them that would determine their behavior, “How
much of a sense do you have of free will controlling your
dreams?”  They say, “None.” or “almost none”.   Whereas, if
they are asked the same question when they are awake, they
will answer that they experience a high degree of free will.  In
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both of these examples, the sense of free will seems to occur
exactly when participants do identify the environmental events
leading up to their own behavior.  The report of the sensation
of free will does not occur when they do not identify specific
events related to their behavior.  This is paradoxical, since in
the situation in which there is less discriminable control, one
should feel more free.
Neither the sense of free will nor the doctrine that flows
from it can be disproved.  Everyone, even the most empirical
scientist, experiences the internal thoughts that precede their
action and so could potentially have the sense that those
thoughts cause their actions.  The sense of free will is like an
independent self  – a god within us.  There is no way to collect
evidence for or against such a god because gods by nature only
indirectly reveal themselves.
Despite peoples’ pervasive illusion of free will, and the fact
that this illusion has become an integral part of much Western
philosophical, religious and legal thinking, it is not a view that
is scientifically supported.  Since the end of World War II many
different areas of behavioral science have shown the many ways
in which behavior is controlled by factors such as past history,
current environmental factors, and broader contextual factors.
We will give a number of examples.
Many researchers in the field of learning within psychology,
including Skinner (1971) have argued against the idea that free
will exists.  He asserts that the fundamental mistake made by all
those who choose weak methods of control is to assume that
the balance of control is left to the individual, when in fact it is
left to other unexamined factors.  For an extensive review, see
Wegner (2002).
In addition, there is considerable research on predicting
psychopathology, that shows that, if one knows enough about
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someone’s background, one can often predict which people will
end up in trouble.  Garbarino (1999) for example, argues that
we could predict with at least some degree of certainty for about
90% of boys who become violent.  They would have a number
of risk factors, such as a history of abuse and/or neglect, exposure
to community violence and a history of difficulties in social
interactions.  For the other 10% or so, it would be much more
difficult to predict, although according to Garbarino, many of
these individuals do have serious disorders at an early age.  There
is a false-alarm rate with these predictions, that is, some of the
time, one would predict that a child would become violent, and
they would not.  The history of this field suggests, however, that
as researchers identify more of the risk factors, becoming violent
or criminal seems less and less like a choice and more and more
like a pattern of behavior that has been learned and reinforced
in multiple contexts.
Early on, the Greeks understood the difference between
appearance and reality, and we are suggesting that, that is where
we have to move for law.  The appearance is that we are governed
by free will, but the reality is we can predict behavior rather
well, as least in certain situations.  Although we cannot yet
predict for many individuals on individual instances, we can
predict in an overall statistical sense.
3 THE COMPETENCE OF INDIVIDUALS TO MAKE
DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS
Both folk psychology and the legal system seem to assume
that most people not only have free will, but that due to being
adults, they have the ability to make wholly rational choices.
Within the law, it is recognized that only a few groups of people
- for example juveniles, the mentally retarded, or the legally
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ESTUDOS POLÍTICOS14
insane – are, due to their assumed incapacities, unable to make
a truly free choice or one that is rational.  These individuals,
due to compromised ‘mental capacity’ or ‘competence’ are usually
judged in different ways.
Modern behavioral science, however, shows that in
addition to there being no free will, that people-in-general are
not rational decision makers.  It is especially important to note
that the typical participant in such research is a relatively well-
educated and well-adjusted college student.  Two different strands
of research are important in the new understanding of how
individuals make decisions.
One of these is a response to the tradition of ‘rational-
choice theory’, which originally came out of economics.  The
idea behind rational-choice theory was that people not only
understood all the options that they had, but once presented
with them, they would rationally make the choice that produced
the best outcome for them.  A great deal of research in recent
years (see Schwartz (2000) for a summary) has suggested that
people’s choices are not rational.  There are a variety of reasons
for this, only some of which summarized by Schwartz.  For
example, sometimes the way information is presented influences
people to make choices that are not rational (e.g. Kahneman &
Tversky, 1984).   Presenting too many choices can effect whether
people make a rational choice or not.  Choices are also
constrained by cultural and social factors; for example, one may
choose a gender-stereotyped activity, even though that is not a
good match for one’s interests and may lead to a less remunerative
career.  It almost seems as if the prevailing opinion in Psychology
at the present time is that people are rarely, if ever, rational
decision makers.
In addition to the by now well establishing research that
people-in-general are rarely rational decision makers, we have
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written previously about limitations in competency of many who
commit criminal acts.  These limitations in their competency,
which greatly effect their tendency to make rational decisions,
result from a number of factors.  One major factor is a person’s
stage of development
4 THE MODEL OF HIERARCHICAL COMPLEXITY
It is a common, everyday observation that most adults are
more competent than most children.  The question is, why is
this so?  In order to give an up to date theory of the ways in
which adults are more competent than children, this paper must
first give some brief history.
Piaget (Guber & Voneche, 1977) had originally explained
the difference between children and adults by saying that there
were four stages of development: the Sensorimotor stage
(Infants), the Preoperational Stage (Children between ages 2
and 5), the Concrete Stage (Children between the ages of 6
and 11), and the Formal stage (Adolescents and beyond).  The
brief answer as to why adults are more competent than children
would be that, from the point of view of Piaget’s theory, adults
should be expected to reason using formal, logical operations.
Children would either not use such reasoning at all
(Preoperations) or they would only use them in a very limited
and concrete fashion.  According to researchers who came after
Piaget, there were several problems with this theory.  One major
problem was that development was seen in the growth of
hypothetical mental structures that were assumed to govern all
or most action of individuals.  The implication of this was that
an adult, for example, would be expected to show formal
operational reasoning in all tasks.  Research increasingly found
that people’s development was characterized much more by a
lack of consistency in their performance across tasks.  This caused
many psychologists to dismiss the notion of stages altogether.
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The Model of Hierarchical Complexity, or MHC (e.g.
Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards, & Krause, 1998) was
originally proposed as a less mentalistic and more useful
explanation of both differences between children and adults and
of the lack of consistency in performance across tasks.  It proposes
an explanation for the apparent stage differences in performance
that can be seen.
The MHC starts with the idea that the environment in
which we live is made up of a large number of tasks.  Some of
the tasks are cognitive (for example, tasks within mathematics,
biology or other areas).  Some of the tasks are interpersonal (for
example, learning how to get other people to do what you want)
or intrapersonal (understanding yourself better).  Each of the
different areas in which there are tasks to be acquired is called a
domain.  The MHC proposes that the tasks within each domain
form a hierarchy, from less hierarchically complex to more
hierarchically complex.  The hierarchy is based on mathematical
principles of how the information is organized ( Coombs, Dawes,
& Tversky, 1970), and of information science ( Commons &
Richards, 1984a, 1984b;  Lindsay & Norman, 1977;  Commons
& Rodriguez, 1990, 1993).  Specifically, hierarchical complexity
refers to the mathematical complexity of the task presented to
the participant, but not directly to the complexity of the
participant’s performance that will successfully complete the
given task.
Every task contains a multitude of subtasks ( Overton,
1990).  When the subtasks are carried out by the participant in
a required order, the task in question is successfully completed.
Therefore, the model asserts that all tasks fit in some sequence
of tasks, making it possible to precisely determine the hierarchical
order of task complexity.  Tasks vary in complexity in two ways:
either as horizontal (involving classical information); or as vertical
(involving hierarchical information).
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4.1 Horizontal (Classical Information) Complexity
Horizontal (Classical Information) Complexity : Classical
information describes the number of “yes-no” questions it takes
to do a task.  For example, if one asked a person across the room
whether a penny came up heads when they flipped it, their
saying “heads” would transmit 1 bit of “horizontal” information.
If there were 2 pennies, one would have to ask at least two
questions, one about each penny.  Hence, each additional 1-bit
question would add another bit.  Let us say they had a four-
faced top with the faces numbered 1, 2, 3, or 4.  Instead of
spinning it, they tossed it against a backboard as one does with
dice in a game.  Again, there would be 2 bits.  One could ask
them whether the face had an even number.  If it did, one would
then ask if it were a 2.  Horizontal complexity, then, is the sum of
bits required by just such tasks as this.
4.2  Vertical  (Hierarchical) ComplexityVertical
(Hierarchical) Complexity : Hierarchical complexity refers to the
number of recursions that the co-ordinating actions must perform
on a set of primary elements.  Actions at a higher order of
hierarchical complexity: a) are defined in terms of actions at the
next lower order of hierarchical complexity; b) organize and
transform the lower-order actions; c) produce organizations of
lower-order actions that are new and not arbitrary,  and cannot
be accomplished by those lower-order actions alone.  Once these
conditions have been met, we say the higher-order action co-
ordinates the actions of the next lower order.
To illustrate how lower actions get organized into more
hierarchically complex actions, let us turn to a simple example.
Completing the entire operation 3 x (4 + 1) constitutes a task
requiring the distributive act.  That act non-arbitrarily orders
adding and multiplying to coordinate them.  The distributive
act is therefore one order more hierarchically complex than the
acts of adding and multiplying alone and it indicates the singular
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proper sequence of the simpler actions.  Although someone who
simply adds can arrive at the same answer, people who can do
both display a greater freedom of mental functioning.  Therefore,
the order of complexity of the task is determined through
analyzing the demands of each task by breaking it down into its
constituent parts.
The hierarchical complexity of a task refers to the number
of concatenation operations it contains, that is, what is the
number of recursions that the coordinating actions must perform?
An order-three task has three concatenation operations.  A task
of order three operates on a task of order two and a task of order
two operates on a task of order one (a simple task).  The MHC
specifies 14 orders of hierarchical complexity. The sequence is
as follows: (0) computory, (1) sensory & motor, (2) circular
sensory-motor, (3) sensory-motor, (4) nominal, (5) sentential,
(6) preoperational, (7) primary, (8) concrete, (9) abstract, (10)
formal, (11) systematic, (12) metasystematic, (13) paradigmatic,
and (14) cross-paradigmatic.
When an individual solves a task at a particular order of
complexity, we sometimes say that they have performed that
task at that stage.   The first four stages of MHC (0-3) correspond
to Piaget’s sensorimotor stage at which infants and very young
children perform.  Adolescents and adults can perform at any of
the subsequent stages.  MHC stages 4 through 6 correspond to
Piaget’s  pre-operational stage; 7 through 8 correspond to his
concrete operational stage; and 9 through 11 correspond to his
formal operational stage.  The three highest stages in the MHC
are not represented in Piaget’s model.  Because MHC stages are
conceptualized in terms of the hierarchical complexity of tasks
rather than in terms of mental representations (as are Piaget’s
stages), the highest stage represents successful performances on
the most hierarchically complex tasks rather than intellectual
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maturity. Aspects of 5 stages most relevant to understanding
criminal behavior in adolescents and adults will be described
below.
5 THE APPLICATION OF THE MODEL OF
HIERARCHICAL COMPLEXITY TO EXPLAINING
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
One major way in which we use the Model of Hierarchical
Complexity to explain criminal behavior is by stating that in a
number of related domains, and for a variety of reasons, it is
likely that the development of some individuals engaging in
criminal behavior has become arrested.  Two domains we might
consider are the interpersonal domain, particularly the
development of empathy and attachment (Commons &
Wolfsont, 2002; Commons & Miller, 2007), and the moral
domain.  A primary cause of arrested development, and the one
the leads to the most serious outcomes, is exposure to traumatic
events such as abuse, abandonment, or neglect.  Problems in
biology (increased or decreased sensitivity to others’ emotions
and preferences; brain damage that results in learning or
processing disabilities) can also lead to a lack of development.
In some cases, perhaps the less serious ones, individuals may not
have been exposed to appropriate models, and so would not
have learned the behaviors necessary to move up in stage.
The result of arrested development in these domains is
that people who in other domains may understand how things
work very well, are not as good at understanding what is going
on in a given situation; that is, they fail to solve tasks that are as
hierarchically complex in the domain of empathy, for example,
or moral reasoning.  Both folk psychology and the law assume
that people develop evenly in all domains.  They assume that if
someone is an adult and shows some measure of competence in
one area - for example, they might be able to hold a job - that
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they will be equally competent in all areas.  An essential feature
of the MHC is that people’s development within each task
domain proceeds separately, so it may be perfectly possible to
have a person who solves tasks at more of an adult stage in some
areas, but more like a child in other areas.
These ideas can be most easily illustrated with some specific
examples.
5.1  Preoperational Stage Behavior: Individuals who solve
tasks such as empathy or moral reasoning at the preoperational
order do not think about the implications of what they are doing,
and how it might effect others.  They do not differentiate
between their fantasies and reality, and tend to provide magical
explanations for occurrences.  They have little reality-based
understanding of the causality of behavior, especially
interpersonal behavior.  They have a propensity to see all
behavior in terms of their own understanding and fantasies of
the world, and second of all, to report that various occurrences
contain messages specifically directed toward them and their
behavior.  It should be stressed that such a low stage of behavior
in this domain is thought to reflect an extreme degree of
abnormality in the adult individual.  This would most likely be
due to traumatic experiences during infancy or early childhood
(e.g. Noam, Chandler, & LaLonde, 1995;  Rodriguez, 1997,
personal communication).  Such experiences have generally
been extensive and/or long-standing, not just single experiences.
Due to the effects of these kinds of experiences on development
in domains such as attachment, empathy and moral reasoning,
This kind of behavior would most likely be seen in criminals
who have committed seemingly senseless crimes, with a great
deal of brutality toward victims.
5.2 Primary Stage Behavior: People at the primary stage
might have an initial understanding of another person’s
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perspective but not integrate it with their own.  This makes it
impossible to make deals that both parties feel are fair for an
extended period of time.  They would have a beginning
understanding of reality so as not to be stuck in their own
fantasies.  They think about one perspective on that reality at a
time.  For example, they would see a relationship only in terms
of their own needs or alternatively, in terms of the needs of the
other.  They may reject the needs of the other, or reject their
own needs.  Here, we would speculate that the trauma or
negative interpersonal experience would also have arrested
development at this stage in this domain.  But such trauma may
have happened somewhat later, maybe sometime after age two,
but before age nine or ten.  The effects of such traumatic or
negative interpersonal events will have limited the kinds and
extent of interactions that the individual has had with primary
attachment figures.  By limiting the possible learning experiences,
therefore, learning about the other’s perspective, and the
resultant development, will not occur as readily.  This stage of
relating would not, again, be seen in what we would call normal
adults.  But the form of psychopathology would be less serious
than those who relate at the preoperational stage.  A psychopath
would be likely to function at the primary stage in terms of
empathy and/or morality, and would be likely to focus only on
their own needs.
5.3 Concrete Stage Behavior: Because the individuals
integrate the perspective of another with their own, this allows
for somewhat fair deals to be made and relationships formed.
Many of the people in jail – drug dealers, pimps, and prostitutes
–  perform at the concrete operational stage in domains such as
empathy and morality.  They know the deal, and how to make
deals.  They do not, however, know the social norms that operate
beyond the realm of deals between two individuals.  That is,
their social behavior is based on deals with individuals but they
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do not think more generally of what others, even in their own
social group, might think.  For example, a person who has sex
with underage girls might be concrete in thinking about these
occurrences because the girl might agree to the sexual encounter.
But they are breaking the social norm against sex with underage
people. This type of conception can also be seen in at least some
people with narcissistic and antisocial personality disorders,
especially on tasks with which they have problems.  People with
antisocial personalities fail to conform to social norms (a next-
stage behavior), and they can be deceitful ( Thorpe & Olson,
1997).  Such deceit is often caught by the social group.   People
with narcissistic personalities feel as if they are entitled to things
to a much greater extent than others seem to feel.  This shows
the extent to which they are out of touch with social norms.
Normal people derive their sense of what behavior was reasonable
and their sense of their own social standing from social norms at
the abstract stage which is one stage further. The people with
antisocial personalities do not generate and ‘hold onto’ these
norms on their own; they generally need authority figures to
enforce the norms.
5.4  Abstract-Stage Behavior:  At the abstract stage,
people know the social norms but some may be in the negative
step of the transition from abstract to formal – the anti-norms.
During transition ( Commons & Richards, 2002) the first step
of leaving the earlier stage adaptation is to negate the actions of
that stage.  People who are performing at this step of the
transition may go against the social norms.  Of course, this is to
be expected in at least some adolescents.  It is when this kind of
thinking persists beyond adolescence that there can be a
problem.  For example, individuals who are in the negative step
of the transition can do tremendous harm to others who belong
to a perceived  “out group”.  Such out groups may include rival
gangs.  This is also seen in many national conflicts, in which
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the enemy is discounted and easily killed.  The out-group
individuals get pejorative names and this is seen as justifying
being able to treat them badly.  This is seen massively in cases of
racial, religious and national origin discrimination.  Erikson (as
summarized by Hoare, 2002) also argued that prejudice against
others resulted from the tendency of humans to identify with
groups.
The reasons for not progressing beyond the abstract stage
are different from those for not progressing beyond the lower
stages.  For one thing, data suggest that a relatively large group
of adults are reasoning at the abstract stage in at least some
domains (e.g.  Armon & Dawson, 1997).  Therefore, for the
most part, we are not talking about individuals who have become
stuck in their development due to traumatic events so much as
we are talking about adults who have not progressed beyond a
certain point in this aspect of their development.  For a good
number of adult individuals, having abstract stage relationships
would be expected at least normatively.  They might have
experiences with a primary attachment figure who reasons about
attachment relationships at the abstract stage.  They might have
had experiences only with a relatively small, limited social group,
something that also might limit their development in this regard.
5.5 Formal Stage Behavior:  At the formal stage, the
limitation of understanding causality may lead each member in
a relationship to blame the other for the problems in the
relationship ( Koplowitz, 1984).  What is different from the
abstract stage view, is that evidence and logic are brought to
bear.  During the transition to systematic, therefore, when the
failures in the relationship are discussed, the statements of blame
do not consist of unsupported accusations, instead they are
supported with evidence and with logic.  The problem is that,
with simple, one-variable causal models, the blame is perceived
as belonging only to one party in the relationship.  Individuals
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also formalize their roles as victim and perpetrator, following rules
for what actions fit those roles.
Because the formal stage is also the stage in which social
norms are captured in bureaucracies of formalized rules, people
acting as part of a bureaucracy may be able to justify acting to
destroy certain groups of people.  Such formal operational
bureaucrats could include people who work in the genocide
machines of various states.  They may put into place policies
that result in the killing a great number of people, not because
they are angry, but because they “are just doing their job” as
Kohlberg (1984) argued was shown by  Milgram (1974).  Such
behavior may not be associated with disordered attachment,
empathy or morality at the individual level.
6  IMPLICATIONS OF THE VIEW FOR DEALING
WITH CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
At which of the above stages would criminals know right
from wrong?  At which could they be judged competent, versus
incompetent?  The law itself has no standard mental age for
determining that someone is Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
(NGRI).  Our estimate is that they use a standard of the 5 year
old.  Around that age, children perform at the Preoperational
stage 6.  When asked, children can say that some action is right
or that it is wrong.  Hence, we would assess the moral-stage
development of the accused person as being at the preoperational
stage at the time.  Going beyond just assessing this very basic
level of knowing right and wrong, with the Model of Hierarchical
Complexity we have the tools to determine how well people
can understand what it means to be right or wrong, how far
they have developed in the domain of empathy, attachment,
social perspective-taking, their moral development.  Even if
social perspective taking skills were reasonable, we might find,
for example, that individuals solve moral reasoning (right from
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wrong) type-tasks at a relatively high stage, but shows deficits
in development in the domains of empathy or attachment.
Another individual may be reasoning in these domains at the
abstract stage and justify criminal actions because of an
understanding that they apply to people in an ‘out-group’ not
his ‘in-group.’  The kinds of interventions that would be used
for individuals with these different profiles would be very
different.  Because, thus far, the legal system uses very out-of-
date notions of human behavior, and very limited notions of
competency, we are very far from effective intervention with
people who have committed criminal acts.  One form they could
be applied is in competence to stand trial.  Being below Abstract
stage 9 in the social area means the person is incompetent to
deal with social norms.  So if society does not approve of a
behavior, the person might not understand that.  Criminals are
often surprised that behaviors that are based on an agreement
between two people could be illegal.
7  TRAITS ASSOCIATED WITH OFFENDING
In addition to a child-stage understanding of social
relations, and of right and wrong, behavioral scientists have
found offenders have a number of additional traits and behaviors
that increase their likelihood of offending.  Most of these are
now thought to have a biological basis that interacts with poor
child rearing including abuse and abandonment.  These are
reviewed next.
8  SUBSTANCE ABUSERS
Most psychotropic drugs either change the reinforcing
value of events, as with “uppers” like methamphetamine, and
cocaine or opiates like heroin, or increase impulsivity and
decrease judgment, such as the hallucinogen like marijuana,
peyote, LSD.  Alcohol also is a strong psychotropic.  Substance
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abuse is common as a co-morbid condition in the mentally ill.  It
is also found in almost all those who commit illegal and destructive
acts (whether they are caught and adjudicated or not).
9  ATTENTION DEFICIT AND HYPERACTIVITY
DISORDER
There are three aspects of Attention Deficit and
Hyperactivity Disorder that are associated with offending.  First,
people are impulsive.  They interrupt others, have trouble
waiting for their turn (preoperational stage 6), and most
importantly have trouble delaying reinforcement, which is again
a primary stage 7 or concrete stage 8 characteristic.  Second,
they are more likely to take a small immediate reward over a
delayed much larger reward.  They tend to act without prior
reflection about the consequences.  Third, they also often have
poor social perspective taking skill, which is associated with their
low stage social behavior.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED APPLICATIONS
If individuals do not have free will, then punishing
individuals because of their bad will does not make sense.  But
that does not mean that society should not do something about
their behavior.  If, in addition, it is understood that in many
cases people offend because they have significant deficits in a
number of areas of their development, again, punishment might
not be the best course of action by the society.  Instead, when
an individual commits a crime, the legal system and the society
need to come to an understanding of the specific deficits of this
offender and what kinds of interventions would be most likely
to result in a more productive member of society and protection
of society.
What would benefit the society, including the victims of
crimes, and the individual offender, given that the person did
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commit the crime?  Ideally, solutions would come more from
the systems perspective, with all the stakeholders involved in
making a consensual decision.  This assumes that a number of
things would have to change.
First, it is important to change society’s views about free
will as the cause of ‘bad’ behavior, as well as what works in
bringing about change in people’s behavior.  Although we have
concentrated on the general belief in free will, a whole other
topic would to examine the failure of punishment to bring about
change.  The majority of individuals in this country and many
others believe that punishment is an effective way to control
behavior.  This belief in the need for punishment is simply
another folk psychological belief for which there is little
empirical evidence.  Behavioral scientists have a long way to go
in order to convince people that this is not so.
Second, the legal system itself would have to move from
being an adversarial system to being more of a mediation-based
system.  Mediation is increasingly being used, for example in
cases of divorce or cases involving the rights of minor children
or incapacitated individuals, such as the mentally retarded
(Personal Communication, Mark Hauser, 2007).  Mediation
would have to move to being a much more central part of the
legal system.
Finally, the nature of rehabilitation would have to change.
Currently there is little to no rehabilitation.   Rehabilitation
would need to include: education, therapy, and drug treatment,
as well as ways of protecting the public, like home incarceration
and supervision of individuals who are undergoing rehabilitation.
When we discuss education and therapy, we are not referring to
the kinds of systems currently in place.  It is clear that individuals
who have been grievously injured due to the interactions between
their biological systems and their early experiences will need
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extensive and intensive education and therapy combined.  Such
intervention would be designed to rehabilitate the individual
in the specific areas in which they have been shown to have
deficits.  It would need to be individualized for each individual.
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